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Compulsory Licensing of Critical
Patents Under CERCLA?
KENNETH J. NUNNENKAMP*
Compulsory licensing, when applied to patents, is a term that
often evokes passionate responses from attorneys. Some attorneys
(most often patent attorneys) perceive compulsory licensing as an
evil that seeks to gut the heart of a constitutional grant.' For
others, compulsory licensing is an essential element of fairness and
social good.' For still others, compulsory licensing is a necessary
evil. 3
* Attorney, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, Washington, D.C.;
J.D., 1986, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 1983, Ohio Wesleyan University. The author is
presently practicing intellectual property and antitrust litigation, licensing, and counseling
for clients in all technology areas. This article represents the views of the author, and
should not be interpreted as the view of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dun-
ner, or any of its past, present, or future clients.
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to secure for
inventors "the exclusive right to their . ..discoveries." US. CONST. art. I, § 8. Examples
of the many warnings against the perils of compulsory patent licensing include: Wil-
liam W. Beckett & Richard M. Merriman, Will The Patent Provisions of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 Promote Progress or Stifle Invention?, 37 J. PAT OFF. Soc'v 38
(1955); George E. Frost, The Case Against Drug Patent Compulsory Licensing, PAT.
TRADEMARK. COPYRIGHT J RES, EDUC, 84 (1963); B.R. Pravel, Say "'No" to More Com-
pulsory Licensing Statutes, 2 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N. Q. J 185 (1974); Warren F.
Schwarz, Mandatory Patent Licensing of Air Pollution Control Technology, 57 VA. L.
REV. 719, 744 (1971); Leroy Whitaker, Compulsory Licensing - Another Nail in the Cof-
fin, 2 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N. Q. J. 155 (1974).
' The justifications advanced include social and economic ones. See, e.g., SUBCOMM.
ON PATENTS. TRADEMARKS. AND COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RE-
SEARCH STUDIES IN PATENT LAW , 84TH CONG., 2D SESS.. RESEARCH STUDIES IN PATENT
LAW, Vol. 1, Study 1, 27-28 (Comm. Print 1956-1963); Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Pat-
ent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8 Nw J INT'L. L. &
Bus. 666 (1988); S. Delvalle Goldsmith, The Case For "Restricted" Compulsory Licens-
ing, 2 AM INTELL PROP. L Ass'N Q.J. 146 (1974); A. Jason Mirabito, Compulsory Patent
Licensing for the United States: A Current Proposal, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 404 (1975);
Pankaj Tandon, Patents With Compulsory Licensing, 90 J POL. EcoN 470 (1982); Evan
Ackiron, Comment, Patents For Critical Pharmaceuticals: The AZT Case, 17 AM. J. L &
MED. 145 (1991).
' See, e.g., Tom Arnold & Paul Janicke, Compulsory Licensing Anyone? An Unplan-
ned-for Addition to the United States Patent System, 55 J. PAT, OFF. SOC'Y 149 (1973);
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Much of the discussion about compulsory patent licensing
tends to focus on the economic harm or benefit that will accrue
from compulsory licensing, depending upon the author's perspec-
tive." Advocates of a strong patent system point to the innovations
that have had a material impact upon our lives, such as the devel-
opment of lifesaving drugs and medical treatments." These inno-
vations, we are told, are only possible if the returns on investment
are sufficient to persuade investors to take the risk attendant with
such development.6
Advocates of compulsory patent licensing, on the other hand,
point to the "evils" of monopoly profits, supracompetitive benefits,
and the relative unavailability of some products, such as these
same lifesaving drugs and treatments, to those of lesser means as
justifications to deny the innovator his patent monopoly.7 These
advocates have presented both economic and moral grounds for
their positions in the apparent hope of deflating their opponents'
arguments that compulsory patent licensing will stifle innovation. 8
W. Brown Morton, Jr., Compulsory Licensing, 2 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J 171
(1974).
1 Although many anticompulsory licensing advocates argue that their position is
aimed more at the "social good" of promoting innovation, the discussion that accompanies
this position invariably focuses on the economic benefits that accrue to the innovators as
the basis for further innovation. The unarticulated assumption is that further innovation
spawns the social good of a better life through improved products. See Frost, supra note 1,
at 95-97. See also Martin J. Adelman & Friedrich K. Juenger, Patent-Antitrust: Patent
Dynamics and Field-of-Use Licensing, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 273, 291 (1975). This, however,
may not always be the case. For example, while the automobile, clearly one of the most
influential innovations of post-Victorian times, has accomplished much social good, it is at
least arguable that it has done an equal amount of social harm. In the end, it is the eco-
nomic motive that drives innovation. See, e.g., Whitaker, supra note 1, at 163-66. Any
social good that is derived from innovation is often the byproduct of the economic driving
force. Id. See also Frost, supra note 1.
0 Compare Frost, supra note 1, with Ackiron, supra note 2.
0 F.M. SCHERER. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING 14
(Monograph 1977-2). Scherer suggests: "By inhibiting and delaying imitation, patent
grants prevent the premature erosion of innovator's profits and hence instill expectations in
the minds of would be innovators and inventors that their efforts stand a good chance of
being rewarded." See also, Frost, supra note 1; Beckett and Merriman, supra note 1, at
52-59.
See Ackiron, supra note 2.
* See Mirabito, supra note 2. Some commentators also argue that anticompetitive
practices associated with patenting make compulsory licensing essential. For example, in an
article co-authored by Richard Gilbert, chief economist at the Department of Justice Anti-
trust Division, the concept of "preemptive patenting" was critisized. R. Gilbert & D. New-
berg, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly, 72 AM. EcON. REv. 514, 524
(June 1982). The authors describe a preemptive patent as when firms "spend resources on
the development of new technologies, and deny society the use of these technologies." Id.
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More often than not, advocates of compulsory patent licens-
ing argue for unrestricted compulsory licensing.' They decry the
"slippery slope" arguments advanced by opponents of compulsory
patent licensing as unnecessarily catastrophic and suggest that the
impact of compulsory patent licensing would be small but impor-
tant. 10 These advocates also point to other countries' compulsory
licensing provisions as proof that compulsory licensing does not
result in the downfall of a patent system."
Clearly, the debate over compulsory patent licensing will con-
tinue. The respective sides begin with biases, leading them to dif-
ferent value judgments about the importance of innovation and
the effect that compulsory patent licensing would have on research
and development of new products. 2 Confirming the veracity of
these varying positions, however, is not within the scope of this
article. Nor is the issue of whether compulsory patent licensing is
inherently good or bad.18 Rather, this article explores the concept
of compulsory patent licensing in a specific situation, that is,
where patents claim processes or products that are critical to ac-
complishing the goals of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, or CERCLA."4
The number of patents relating to the cleanup of hazardous
waste is growing at an exponential rate. As of early 1994, there
were hundreds of such patents. 5 In 1992, the number of patent
They complain that the result is that resources are "expended on research and development
on to produce 'sleeping patents' which are withheld from use, and the firm with monopoly
power maintains its monoply position." Id.
See Fauver, supra note 2; Research Studies in Patent Law, supra note 2, at 27.
, See Fauver, supra note 2; Ackiron supra note 2.
I See Fauver, supra note 2; Mirabito, supra note 2, at 424-25.
' See, e.g., Tandon, supra note 2, at 470 (stating that the paper is concerned with
"the monopoly problem associated with patents").
" Whether compulsory licensing is making a "comeback" is also open to debate but
beyond the scope here. It is interesting to note, however, that recent speeches from the
Department of Justice Antitrust Division suggest that compulsory licensing is at least a
consideration. See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, remarks before Association of American Law Schools (Jan.
7, 1994); Anne K. Binganan, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dept. of
Justice, remarks at Celebration of 60th Anniversary of Founding of Antitrust Division
(Jan. 10, 1994) (transcripts available from U.S. Dept. of Justice).
" 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1988).
1, Examples of U.S. patents that have been issued recently and will have a direct
effect on the cleanup of hazardous waste sites include: U.S. Patent No. 5,276,253, issued
Jan. 4, 1994 entitled In-Situ Remediation and Vitrification of Contaminated Soils, Depos-
its and Buried Materials; No. 5,270,515, issued Dec. 14, 1993, entitled Microwave Plasma
Detoxification Reactor and Process for Hazardous Wastes; No. 5,269,906, issued Dec. 14,
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applications related to hazardous waste grew to a number large
enough that the United States Patent and Trademark Office es-
tablished a separate class for hazardous waste-related applica-
tions. 6 The large number of patents in this area suggests that this
multibillion dollar industry will not escape the focus of compul-
sory licensing advocates for long. This article, therefore, seeks to
place in context the issue of compulsory licensing of these types of
patents.
This article first discusses the recent history of compulsory
licensing of patent rights mandated by the federal government.
Although not widely known, there are currently several statutes
that compel licensing of patents and other intellectual property
rights for a variety of reasons. Selected statutory provisions and
certain judicially ordered compulsory patent licenses, including
those cases where compulsory licenses were granted because of
overriding public interest concerns, are reviewed. Then this article
turns to the purposes of CERCLA to asses whether, at the
reauthorization stage for this comprehensive cleanup legislation,
compulsory patent licensing should, or need be, considered in light
of CERCLA's goals. For the purposes of this discussion, it is as-
sumed the reader is familiar with the general provisions and na-
ture of CERCLA.
I. COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING As IT EXISTS TODAY
The patent grant is often discussed in terms of the right to
exclude.' 7 In fact, the right to exclude has not always been im-
1993, entitled Process for the Recovery of Oil From Waste Oil Sludges; and No. 5,261,150,
issued Nov. 16, 1993, entitled Automated Hazardous Waste Accessing Apparatus. The
author maintains a file that includes several hundred similar patents, as well as other pat-
ents that materially relate to hazardous waste cleanup activities.
1" See 1136 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE 211, 211-17 (Mar. 31, 1992). Class 588 is desig-
nated as including applications relating to Hazardous or Toxic Waste Destruction or Con-
tainment. Class 588's description reads:
This is the generic class for (1) hazardous or toxic waste destruction by any
means to include heating, chemical action, or the interaction with any form
of radiation; (2) hazardous or toxic waste containment by any means to in-
clude storage in a simple container, solidification, vitrification, cementation,
and more elaborate methods of storage such as marine teutonic or extrater-
restrial storage; and (3) hazardous or toxic waste conversion by any means
(e.g., chemical, physical, etc.) to an environmentally safe substance.
The Supreme Court stated in 1980 that "[clompulsory licensing is a rarity in our
patent system .. " Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980).
Since the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the possibility of corn-
[VOL. 9:397
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bued with the strength it is given today. Moreover, the right to
exclude, unlike the right to obtain damages, is written permis-
sively in the patent statute.' 8
Although the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit have clearly breathed strength into the notion
that the denial of an injunction is the exception and not the rule,"'
the present patent system is not purely exclusionary. There are
compulsory patent licensing provisions in the United States Code
and there are several judicially created forms of compulsory pat-
ent licenses.
A. Statutory Compulsory Licensing Provisions
Statutory compulsory patent licensing exists under the Clean
Air Act,20 the Atomic Energy Act of 1948,2" and the Tennessee
pulsory licensing seems even more remote. That Court has stated on many occasions that
the core of the patent right is the right to exclude. Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6
F.3d 770, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Smith Int'l v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577-81
(Fed. Cir. 1983). Moreover, even if an inventor does not practice his patented invention, he
still may exclude all others from practicing it. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper
Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Polaroid Graphics
Imaging, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1135, 1144 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd, 887 F.2d 1095 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
M Compare 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1988)(emphasis added) ("The several courts having
jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles
of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court
deems reasonable.") with 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988)(emphasis added) ("Upon finding for the
claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the in-
fringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention
by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.").
The section dealing with injunctions is clearly permissive, while that dealing with
damages is not. Moreover, section 283 requires the court to consider "the principles of
equity," while section 284 focuses solely on awarding damages adequate to compensate the
patent owner. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-84 (1988).
" See, e.g., Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 215; Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd.,
868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989); Connell v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Smith Int'l, 718 F.2d at
1577-78.
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1988). The compulsory patent license provision reads:
Whenever the Attorney General determines that, upon application of the Ad-
ministrator [of EPA] -
(1) that -
(A) in the implementation of the requirements of section 7411, 7412, or
7521 of this title, a right under any United States letters patent, which is
being used or intended for public or commercial use and not otherwise rea-
sonably available, is necessary to enable any person required to comply with
such limitations to so comply, and
1993-94]
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Valley Authority Act.22 In addition, other statutes that provide
patent-like protection, such as the Plant Variety Protection Act2"
and the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,24 provide for
(B) there are no reasonable alternative methods to accomplish such pur-
pose, and
(2) that the unavailability of such right may result in a substantial les-
sening of competition or tendency to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country, the Attorney General may so certify to a
district court of the United States, which may issue an order requiring the
person who owns such patent to license it on such reasonable terms and con-
ditions as the court, after hearing, may determine ....
42 U.S.C. § 7608 (1988).
" The compulsory licensing provision of the Atomic Energy Act was added in 1954.
Pub. L. No. 703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954). That provision reads:
(b) Action by Commission
Whenever any patent has been declared affected with the public interest,
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section
(1) the Commission is licensed to use the invention or discovery covered
by such patent in performing any of its powers under this chapter; and
(2) any person may apply to the Commission for a nonexclusive patent
license to use the invention or discovery covered by such patent, and the
Commission shall grant such patent license to the extent that it finds that
the use of the invention or discovery is of primary importance to the conduct
of an activity by such person authorized under this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2183(b) (1988) (emphasis added). In addition to compelling licenses under
section 2183, the Atomic Energy Act prohibits a court from enjoining the use of an inven-
tion licensed under 42 U.S.C. § 2184, and also requires that a compulsory license be issued
[w]henever the owner of any patent ... granted for any invention or discov-
ery of primary use in the utilization or production of special nuclear material
or atomic energy is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have inten-
tionally used such patent in an manner so as to violate any of the antitrust
laws specified in section 2135(a) ...
42 U.S.C. § 2188 (1988).
2 Under the Tennessee Valley Authority Act (TVA Act), if a patent is infringed by
any of a number of actions by the Authority the exclusive remedy of the patent owner is
for reasonable compensation. 16 U.S.C. § 831(r) (1988). Interestingly, because the TVA is
not the government, suit under the TVA Act is in the relevant district court, not the Court
of Federal Claims. See Alco Standard Corp. v. TVA, 448 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Tenn.
1978).
"a Under this Act, which provides patent-like protection for new varieties of sexually
reproduced plants, i.e. grown from seeds, a compulsory license is required if it is necessary
to ensure an adequate supply of food, and the compulsory sale is required of farmers of
saved seed to other farmers. See 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (1988).
11 This statute provides patent-like protection for mask works used to manufacture
semiconductor chips. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988). This act provides a limited compulsory
license to "innocent" purchasers, permitting distribution after notice of all chips embodying




compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing also exists for other
types of intellectual property
35
These specific compulsory licensing provisions are not the
only statutory limitations on a patentee's right to exclusive use
and control over a claimed invention. Additional statutory provi-
sions exist that deny a patent holder the full benefit of the right to
exclude. For example, the patent statute's reissue provision, which
allows reissuance of a patent claiming the original invention when-
ever a patent "through error without any deceptive intention is
deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid,"2 allows courts
considering infringement actions based on that patent to "provide
for the continued manufacture, use or sale" of infringing products
or the practice of infringing processes "to the extent and under
such terms as the court deems equitable for the protection of in-
vestments made or business commenced before the grant of the
reissue."" Finally, the federal government has reserved for itself
the right to a compulsory license of any patent whose teachings it
chooses to exploit.28 This right applies broadly and is frequently
utilized by the federal government.29
25 For example, until recently, broadcast television signals were compulsorily licensed
to cable television operators under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 119 (1988).
2 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988).
27 35 U.S.C. § 252 (1988). This right to continued use is referred to as an "interven-
ing right." See. e.g., Seattle Box Co., Inc. v. Industrial Crating & Packing, Inc., 756 F.2d
1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Bic Leisure Prods. v. Windsurfing Int'l, I F.3d 1214, 1220-21
(Fed. Cir. 1993). In 1980, Congress enacted the patent reexamination statute, which ex-
tended the concept of intervening rights to reexamined patents:
(b) Any proposed amended or new claim determined to be patentable and
incorporated into a patent following a reexamination proceeding will have the
same effect as that specified in section 252 of this title for reissued patents on
the right of any person who made, purchased, or used anything patented by
such proposed amended or new claim, or who made substantial preparation
for the same, prior to issuance of a certificate under the provisions of subsec-
tion (a) of this section.
35 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1988).
28 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1988). This right to use must be paid for with "reasonable com-
pensation." However, under no circumstances can an injunction be obtained against the
government. This right also applies to parties acting on behalf of the government, such as
contractors supplying goods pursuant to a government contract.
" Moreover, it is the general policy of the government to license patents to which it
holds titles. For example, the Department of Energy has an Invention Licensing Process
delineated at 10 C.F.R. Part 781 (1993). Under the pertinent regulations, any party inter-
ested in obtaining a license under a federally owned patent can apply for a nonexclusive
license from the Department of Energy (DOE). 10 C.F.R. § 781.1 (1993). In certain cases
DOE may also grant exclusive licenses. Id.
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These statutes illustrate that compulsory licensing of patents
and other intellectual property is not new in this country, although
the vast majority of patents escape these provisions. On the other
hand, the United States is one of only a few countries that has no
general compulsory licensing provision."0 Despite the existence of
statutory and judicial compulsory licensing, it is likely that any
proposed compulsory patent licensing provision in CERCLA or
any other statute will be subjected to intense scrutiny. Analyzing
the need for, or desirability of, a compulsory patent licensing pro-
vision for CERCLA requires consideration of both the administra-
tion and effects of the existing statutes and judicial doctrines.
B. Compulsory Licensing Under the Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act, enacted in 1970, sought to impose rigor-
ous standards on the amounts of pollutants discharged into the
atmosphere from any source.3 The Act represented Congress' re-
sponse to growing national concern about air-quality levels and
This process has been used in at least one CERCLA-related case. See Petition of
Southern Pacific Transportation Co. and SP Environmental Systems, Inc. for Termination
of Partially Exclusive License, before the Invention Licensing Appeal Board, U.S. Dept. of
Energy, seeking termination of partially exclusive license under U.S. patent licensing in
situ vitrification process.
11 Many compulsory patent licensing advocates point to foreign compulsory licensing
provisions as partial grounds for a United States statute. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note
2, at 146. Recently signed international treaties suggest that there is no thought in these
countries to do away with their compulsory licensing schemes. Both the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS) allow for compul-
sory patent licensing under certain conditions. Article 1709 of NAFTA includes at
paragraphs 6-10 provisions to license patent rights compulsorily:
6. A party may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred
by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with
a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking into account the legitimate
interests of other persons.
North American Free Trade Agreement, 1992, art. 1709, part 6 (Emphasis added). Para-
graph 10 expands on this concept.
Similarly, TRIPS Article 30 (emphasis added) provides:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by
a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a
normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the le-
gitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate inter-
ests of third parties.
Article 31 also expands on permissible "other uses" much like NAFTA's paragraph 10.
42 U.S.C. § 7401-7626 (1988).
[VOL. 9:397
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the need for federal intervention to reduce pollutants emitted from
a variety of sources. 2
Among the purposes of the Clean Air Act, Congress included
the goal of promoting the development of technological solutions
to air quality problems:
The purposes of this subchapter are -
(2) to initiate and accelerate a national research and develop-
ment program to achieve the prevention and control of air
pollution."a
Included as part of this "national research and development pro-
gram" is the compulsory licensing of technology "necessary to en-
able" compliance with the emission limitations of the Act.3 A na-
tional research and development program was thought to be
necessary to meet the short-term goals of the Act. However, Con-
gress expressed concern that the strict penalties for failure to meet
those goals (closure of plants, etc.) could result in the creation of
unintentional monopolies consisting of firms with exclusive rights
to key technologies.3 5 Congress therefore included in the act a
compulsory licensing provision.
Section 7608,"8 the compulsory licensing provision of the
Clean Air Act, generated much debate after its passage, despite
gaining little attention as the Clean Air Act made its way through
" The Act was actually an amendment to the Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1857-8571 (Supp. 1970), and has been amended numerous times since its original
enactment.
33 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(2) (1988).
84 42 U.S.C. § 7608(l)(A) (1988).
11 The Senate Report accompanying the Act noted this concern: "In order to prevent
the Clean Air Act requirements from creating competitive disadvantages which well might
result in increased concentration or control of production facilities in the hands of a few
large companies the Committee has established the framework [for compulsory licensing]."
S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 42 (1970).
" Of the articles published on Section 7608, two present worthwhile and fairly objec-
tive analysis of the compulsory licensing provision: Jeffrey C. Gerber & Peter W. Kitson,
Compulsory Licensing of Patents Under the Clean Air Act of 1970, 54 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
650 (1972); Warren F. Schwartz, supra note 1.
PATENTS
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Congress.37 The lack of early interest in the provision seems
inexplicable .8
It appears, however, that the clamor over section 7608's com-
pulsory patent licensing requirements faded by 1977 when the
statute was "completely revised." 9 Since 1977, scant attention
has been paid to the Act's compulsory licensing provisions. This
may be because there seems to have been no attempts to actually
use the compulsory licensing provision."'
The apparent lack of use of section 7608 raises interesting
implications for proposed compulsory licensing of patents under
CERCLA. On the one hand, advocates of compulsory patent li-
censing could point to the non-use of section 7608 to argue that
there is little harm in having a similar provision in CERCLA as
an insurance policy against market concentration or any other
threat to the availability of cost-effective clean-up options. If a
major breakthrough is made in an area of hazardous waste
cleanup, a CERCLA compulsory patent licensing provision would
ensure that the breakthrough is available for use and that no one
company ends up with an unhealthy concentration of power in the
hazardous waste cleanup market.
On the other hand, compulsory patent licensing opponents
can point to section 7608 as an example of unnecessary legislation
and argue that if a compulsory licensing provision is necessary, it
*" See Gerber & Kitson, supra note 36, at n.10, discussing lack of hearings on section
308 (now 42 U.S.C. § 7608). The authors indicate that the "only reported analyses of
section 308 and its implications appear to be: (1) a letter from Senator Philip Hart . . . to
Hon. Edmund Muskie, . . .; and (2) a letter from Elliott Richardson [then Secretary of
HEW] to Hon. Jennings Randolph." Id.
38 See Gerber & Kitson, supra note 36.
" Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977). Apparently a move was afoot shortly after
passage of the Act to repeal the compulsory licensing provision. See 2 ENV. REP. 46
(1971), in which the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust argues against repeal of
section 308 because of the potential for consumer harm if key pollution control technology
was not available for use by all.
1o Under section 7608, an applicant for a compulsory license would have to obtain a
certification from the Attorney General to a United States District Court that there is a
need for such a license. 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (1988). The court would then, if it agreed, issue
an order requiring the patentee to license the invention on terms set by the court "after
hearing." Id. No cases appear to exist dealing with section 7608 and the compulsory licens-
ing provisions, suggesting that no compulsory licenses were ever sought under this statute,
since there is no other mechanism for obtaining such a license. Of course, this does not
preclude the possibility that the threat of a compulsory license led to private licensing
agreements. This type of "coerced" private licensing is one of the "benefits" that compul-
sory licensing advocates argue favors enactment of a general compulsory licensing provi-
sion. See Fauver, supra note 2, at 667.
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can be added at the time its need becomes apparent. Opponents of
compulsory patent licensing under CERCLA would likely rely on
the hidden costs of compulsory licensing to dissuade adoption of a
provision like section 7608. Because we can never know how many
private licenses were "compelled" without using the formal provi-
sions of section 7608, it is speculative to suggest how many li-
censes would be similarly compelled under a CERCLA compul-
sory provision. Patentees faced with the alternative of reaching an
agreement with a competitor to license a patent or allowing a
court to set the royalty rate for a compulsory license may have
elected the former, both to save costs and remain master of their
fates. Firms can be expected to make similar decisions in the face
of a CERCLA provision. Of course, opponents also would point to
the unknown costs of lost research and development said to result
from compulsory licensing.41
Without a history of applications for compulsory licenses
under section 7608, it is difficult to assess whether a provision in
CERCLA similar to section 7608 would materially aid in achiev-
ing CERCLA's goals and objectives. Clearly, section 7608 re-
quires consideration of a host of factors beyond the mere achieve-
ment of the Clean Air Act's basic goal of reducing air pollution.42
Moreover, section 7608 does not seek to license the field of emis-
sions technology. Rather, it appears to be a relatively narrow pro-
vision designed to allow for compulsory licensing where only one
means of achieving the Act's goals is developed. "a
4" Whitaker, supra note I, at 163-65.
- For example, section 7608 requires that there be a finding by the Attorney General
that the right available under the patent is "not otherwise reasonably available," that
"there are no reasonable alternative methods to accomplish such purpose [presumably the
purpose here is achievement of the statute's emission limitations]," and that "the unavaila-
bility of such right [to use the patented invention] may result in a substantial lessening of
competition or tendency to create a monopoly in any line of commerce in any section of the
country." 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (1988).
As one author has noted, this last requirement appears to have been added to allow a
company to maintain its patent rights unless the license applicant can show that the paten-
tee may corner a market solely because of its ability to meet the pollution control stan-
dards. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 740-41. If this interpretation is correct, Section 7608 is
much narrower than its opponents suggest.
," There are pitfalls to this type of legislation as well. For example, this type of provi-
sion could lead to free-riding competitors who forego the risk and expense of research and
simply wait for their competitors to develop the relevant technology. Once that technology
is available, these competitors point to it as the only available means of achieving the
statute's goals and conclude that it represents a threat of market concentration based solely
on achieving environmental goals. While the Clean Air Act's requirements and deadlines
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C. Judicially Compelled Licenses
In addition to statutory provisions compelling patent licenses,
there have been a number of judicially devised compulsory patent
licenses. Since these situations arise only after judicial proceedings
have begun, some judicially created compulsory licenses result not
from affirmative court action, but from the refusal of a court to
exercise its equitable powers to enjoin an adjudged infringer from
further infringement.4 Other court-ordered compulsory licenses
result from affirmative judicial action in enforcing the antitrust
laws.""
The reasons courts have advanced for denying equitable relief
have varied. Courts have refused permanent injunctions where
there is a strong public interest in the invention covered by the
claims of the patent-in-suit;46 where the injunction sought was
found to be for the purpose of strengthening the patentee's posi-
tion in settlement negotiations;4 7 where it appeared that an injunc-
made such free-riding less likely since compliance was necessary for continued operation,
CERCLA's application would be somewhat different.
11 See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir.)
(refusing to enjoin City's use of potential sewage purification system because such an in-
junction would have left the community without a safe method for disposing of raw sew-
age), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 576 (1934); Landis Tool Co. v. Ingle, 286 F.2d 5 (3d. Cir.
1923) (refusing to grant injunction against patent infringer when the patent holder would
not receive any benefits from the injunction but would receive royalty compensation if pat-
ented machines were completed and sold). Thacher v. Mayor of Baltimore, 219 F.2d 909
(D. Md. 1915), affd, 230 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1916) granted the injunction against future
infringements on the patent, but it did, however, allow the city to keep the present struc-
tures even though they infringed the patents.
" Judicially compelled licenses resulting from violations of the antitrust laws have a
rich history. A variety of activities that raise antitrust concerns can lead to court-ordered
compulsory licenses. For example, it is an antitrust violation "to acquire a monopoly which
is not plainly within the terms of the grant." Mercuroid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Invest-
ment Co., 320 U.S. 661,665 (1944). Moreover, even where a patentee's actions do not rise
to the level of an additional antitrust violation, patent misuse may exist. Dawson Chemical
Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980). A compulsory license of sorts results
upon a finding of patent misuse because the patent is declared enforceable against all par-
ties until the misuse is cleared.
" Activated Sludge, 69 F.2d at 593; Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin Alumni Re-
search Found., 146 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir.) (declining to enter permanent injunction be-
cause the patent holder refused to permit his patent to be used in the irradiation of oleo-
margarine, allowed others to use it, and thereby caused an adverse effect on the public
health), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945).
" Hoe v. Boston Daily Advertiser Corp., 14 F.2d 914, 915 (C.C.D. Mass. 1883) (de-
nying preliminary injunction to restrain further use of newspaper printing press when the
only advantage to the patent holder was an improvement in his position for future settle-
ment negotiations relating to the royalties).
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tion will inflict greater injury on the infringer than benefit on the
patentee;48 and even where the court simply believes that the
plaintiff-patentee's non-use justifies denial of the injunction.
49
While the historical reasons for courts' decisions refusing to
grant injunctions vary, here we are concerned only with those few
cases in which courts have relied on overriding public interest con-
cerns to justify their action (or inaction). Before launching into
those cases, however, some historical perspective is appropriate.
At the turn of the century the Supreme Court held in Conti-
nental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.5" that as a gen-
eral rule patent owners had an absolute right to an injunction
against infringement. While the Supreme Court's general rule
governed many decisions, the first half of the 20th century is re-
plete with judicially carved exceptions to that rule. Exceptions to
this general rule existed before the Continental Paper Bag pro-
nouncement as well. 5' The lower court decisions after Continental
Paper Bag tended to apply closer scrutiny to requests for injunc-
tions in patent-related cases than the Supreme Court advocated.
5 2
Despite this resistance from lower courts, in 1945 the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed its view toward the exclusivity of patent
rights in Hartford Empire Co. v. United States."3 Nontheless,
there subsequently developed a clear trend away from automatic
exclusivity in some lower courts. For example, in Vitamin Tech-
nologists v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation,4 the Ninth
" American Safety Device Co. v. Kurland Chemical Co., 68 F.2d 734, 735 (2d Cir.
1934) (denying injunction since there was a plain and adequate remedy at law, namely the
award of monetary damages to the patent holder).
'0 Foster v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir.) (grant-
ing compulsory license with royalties, instead of granting injunction, to compensate the
patent holder who was not using the patent on his own), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974).
The Foster decision is unique and has not yet been followed.
"' Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429-30 (1908).
See also Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432 (1945) ("A patent
owner is not in the position of quasi-trustee for the public .... He has no obligation either
to use [his invention] or to grant its use to others"), clarified, 324 U.S. 570 (1945).
" See, e.g., Hoe, 94 F.2d at 916.
2 See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir.)
(rejecting injunction as against public interest because injunction would force city to shut
down sewage treatment plant), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 576 (1934). See also American
Safety Device Co. v. Kurland Chem. Co., 68 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1934) (rejecting injunction
on grounds of equity).
6 Hartford Empire Co., 323 U.S. at 432 (1945).
Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 146 F+2d 941 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945).
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Circuit, following the logic of City of Milwaukee, refused an in-
junction against further infringement of the patentee's vitamin D
irradiation process patent because of the impact an injunction
would have on the public interest." The lower courts thus contin-
ued to express reservations about implementing unrestricted ex-
clusivity where the public interest and health were affected by
patent rights. But some lower courts did not stop there. The nar-
rowest view of the exclusivity principle did not appear until 1974
when the Second Circuit decided that a compulsory license of the
patentee's invention was warranted where the patentee was not
exploiting the patent, either by licensing or actual use." The Fos-
ter decision represented the first time since the Supreme Court's
pronouncement in Continental Paper Bag that mere non-use of a
patented invention resulted in a compulsory license. 57 Apparently,
it also stands as the only time in this century in a reported deci-
sion that non-use has resulted in compulsory licensing by a court.
The creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
in 1982 reestablished the Supreme Court's view that exclusivity is
a fundemental aspect of the patent right. The Court reinvigorated
this principle by adopting what is sometimes referred to as the
"property theory" of patent rights, which accords patents the
traditional protection against intrusion or expropriation afforded
other property.58 Early on, the Federal Circuit issued decisions
following the Continental Paper Bag principle suggesting that the
patentee's right to injunctive relief was nearly absolute.59 This
trend continued throughout the 1980s and continues to the pre-
sent.6 The Federal Circuit has consistently upheld a patentee's
right to permanent injunctive relief. On only one occasion did the
'B Id. at 946-47.
5 Foster v. American Mach. and Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974).
" This concept of compulsory licenses based on non-use exists in many other coun-
tries. See generally Goldsmith, supra note 2.
" Ackiron, supra, note 2, at 164.
*" See, e.g., Smith Int'l Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir.)
(considering appeal on motion for preliminary injunction and holding that a grant of a
patent equalled the right to exclude another's or others' use of the patented item without
the holder's permission), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1983).
11 See, e.g., Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Lab., Inc., 794 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (af-
firming lower court's grant of permanent injunction against further infringement of patents
associated with blood oxygenators), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1087 (1987); Joy Technologies,
Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 771 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (recognizing that "the right to exclude
is the essence of the concept of property").
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Court provide less than full injunctive relief, and in that case the
court allowed for a six month transition period because the prod-
uct was health-related. 61
The court has not been blind, however, to the fact that occa-
sions may arise where injunctive relief is not appropriate.6 2 Thus,
the Federal Circuit has acknowledged that 35 U.S.C. section 283
requires consideration of the public interest and other relevant eq-
uities, and permits a district court to deny injunctive relief where
appropriate.6 3
Section 283, by its terms, clearly makes the issuance of an in-
junction discretionary: the court "may grant" relief "in accord-
ance with the principles of equity." The trial court thus has con-
siderable discretion in determining whether the facts of a
situation require it to issue an injunction ....
It is true that it is a principle of general application that courts,
and especially courts of equity, may apparently withhold their
aid where the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the
public interest.64
The Federal Circuit then emphasized that injunctive relief
should not be perceived as automatic whenever infringement ex-
ists: "Counsel are equally mistaken in their apparent belief that
once infringement is establised and adjudicated, an injunction
must follow." 6 5
" See Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Lab., Inc., 794 F.2d 1561(Fed. Cir. 1986). The Federal
Circuit has not been nearly as generous or absolute with respect to its pronouncements
regarding preliminary injunctive relief. See, e.g., Smith Int'l, 718 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed.
Cir.) (allowing the issuance of a preliminary injunction before the extent of the infringe-
ment was shown provided that an infringement of some nature had been factually proven),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1993); Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott, 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (holding that it was well within the power and discretion of the district court to
issue a preliminary injunction once four separate factors were weighed and measured).
02 See, e.g., Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865-67
(Fed. Cir.) (discussing the permissive language of section 283 and concluding that the trial
judge can, if the equities require, deny injunctive relief entirely), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856
(1984).
6 Id. at 865-67.
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D. Judicial Compulsory Licensing in the Public Interest
As mentioned earlier, several court decisions resulted in judi-
cially compelled licenses where courts, relying on a strong public
interest in the patented technology, refused injunctions. In each of
these cases, the requested injunction would have detrimentally af-
fected the health or economic welfare of large numbers of people.
For example, the patents at issue in City of Milwaukee claimed a
method and apparatus for sewage purification."6 Milwaukee
owned and operated a sewage purification plant found to infringe
those patents.6 7 The trial court perfunctorily enjoined the city
from further infringement of the Activated Sludge patents and the
city appealed.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the trial court's find-
ings and conclusions, but dissolved the injunction, stating:
If, however, the injunction ordered by the trial court is made
permanent in this case, it would close the sewage plant, leaving
the entire community without any means for the disposal of raw
sewage other than running it into Lake Michigan, thereby pol-
luting its waters and endangering the health and lives of that
and other adjoining communities. It is suggested that such
harmful effect could be counteracted by chemical treatment of
the sewage, but where, as here, the health and the lives of more
than half a million people are involved, we think no risk should
be taken, and we feel impelled to deny appellee's contention in
this respect. 8
The City of Milwaukee opinion was the first clearly articulated
decision to rely entirely on the public interest in continued prac-
tice of an invention to deny a patentee injunctive relief. Moreover,
in reaching that conclusion, the court relied on the harmful effects
of pollutants that would now be classified as toxic waste.
A result similar to that in City of Milwaukee was reached in
Vitamin Technologists.'9 In that case, the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered whether injunctive relief should be provided to the owner of a
patent covering a process for Vitamin D irradiation. 71 In denying
66 69 F.2d at 582-83.
87 Id. at 589-92.
e8 Id. at 593.
69 Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945). Arguably, the court's entire discussion about the
injunction is dicta since the court also held the patents involved in the suit were invalid.
70 146 F.2d at 942.
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the injunction, the court relied heavily on the fact that the process
was essential to the production of oleomargarine.' At the time,
margarine was, in the court's words, the "butter of the poor. "72
The court concluded that the strong public interest in using the
patented process to make oleomargarine outweighed the patentee's
interest of exclusivity, and therefore denied an injunction.
73
Finally, in a relatively recent case, a district court indicated
in dictum that it would consider "a compulsory licensing scheme"
if infringement of a patent claiming a condensate polishing appa-
ratus occurred in a power plant. 74 The Ecodyne opinion represents
a continued willingness of courts to consider compulsory licenses
where the invention impacts the general health and welfare of the
public.75 Thus, despite the Federal Circuit's strong stance on ex-
clusivity, the Roche discussion emphasizes that the equitable basis
of injunctions cannot be ignored.
If hazardous waste cleanup represents the same strong public
interest as that found in cases like City of Milwaukee, Vitamin
Technologists, Roche, and Ecodyne, it is possible that statutory
compulsory licensing is unnecessary. No cases testing this proposi-
tion have been found, however; therefore, it remains an open ques-
tion. Considering the money spent on hazardous waste cleanup
each year, it may be a question Congress does not wish to leave
open.
II. THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND CERCLA
CERCLA was enacted as an amendment to the Solid Waste
Disposal Act.76 The purposes for enacting CERCLA are discussed
71 Id. at 944-46.
72 Id. at 945.
11 Id. at 946. Also relevant to this analysis was the fact that the patentee had licensed
the patented process to others but had refused all licenses for use in making oleomargarine.
" Ecodyne Corp. v. Croll-Reynolds Eng'g Co., 491 F. Supp. 194, 198 (D. Conn.
1979) (case dismissed due to lack of case and controversy since there was no allegation of
an actual patent infringement).
" Sometimes it is not always clear whether granting or denying an injunction helps
the public interest. See Critikon Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 28
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1362, 1370-71 (D. Del. 1993). In Critikon, the court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction against continued infringement of a patent claiming an intravenous safety
catheter. The court rejected the accused infringer's assertions that a preliminary injunction
would disrupt hospital procedures while a replacement catheter was found. Id. The court
reasoned that the patentee's strong likelihood of success made the possibility of greater
disruption later more damaging to the public interest. Id. at 1371.
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988).
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in the reports that Congress issued at the time CERCLA became
law." These reports provide the following as some of the reasons
for CERCLA's enactment:
1) "to provide for a national inventory of inactive hazard-
ous waste sites";"8
2) "to establish a program for appropriate environmental
response action to protect public health and the environment
from the dangers posed by such sites;"' 9
3) "to establish prohibitions and requirements concerning
inactive hazardous waste sites;"80 and
4) to provide "strict liability" for cleanup actions "to in-
duce [persons liable for cleanup] voluntarily to pursue appropri-
ate environmental response actions" rather than be held liable in
a court proceeding for such costs. 81
As with previous environmental legislation, CERCLA was
enacted in response to "growing public and Congressional concern
over the magnitude of the [inactive hazardous waste] site prob-
lem.""2 Existing law was deemed "clearly inadequate to deal with
this massive problem,"8 3 and CERCLA was therefore presented
as a means of "abat[ing] and control[ling] the vast problems asso-
ciated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal
sites.""'
Among the specific findings made in the House Report was a
finding that the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste sites must
occur in "a cost-effective manner." 85 The concern with cost-effec-
tive cleanup, although arguably secondary, implicates the role of
intellectual property. Moreover, the focus on cleaning up inactive
hazardous waste sites as fast as possible, combined with the lim-
ited funds available for cleanup activity, means that monopoly
profits are less likely to be tolerated, even where those profits are
7 H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119; S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
1 HR. REP. 1016, at 17.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1.
81 Id. at 17.
8S Id.
83 HR. REP. 1016, at 18.
84 Id. at 22.
11 H.R. REP. 1016, at 25
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otherwise justified under an economic model of the patent
system ."
A. Does Compulsory Licensing Fit Within CERCLA?
Not unexpectedly, there are two opposing but valid theories
concerning the question whether compulsory licensing would help
or harm the cleanup effort mandated by CERCLA. A compulsory
licensing provision in CERCLA that contained the same basic
provisions as section 7608 of the Clean Air Act might, unlike the
Clean Air Act, spur significant interest by licensee applicants.
First, with the large number of patents relating to hazardous
waste cleanup already in existence and the large number of appli-
cations in prosecution at the Patent and Trademark Office, com-
pulsory licensing would provide a reasonably easy means of new
access to non-patent-owning competitors. Ideally, this would have
the effect of driving down prices for Superfund cleanup efforts
through the competitive bidding process. This may, however, only
be a short-term view since compulsory licensing of CERCLA-re-
lated patents could also result in reduced research and develop-
ment efforts. Nonetheless, it may be a legitimate position in an
industry where specifications for cleanup efforts are dictated by
the federal government, and where those specifications can effec-
tively exclude all competition by specifying a patented product or
process for use at the cleanup site.
87
Additionally, viewed in the manner of the courts in City of
Milwaukee or Vitamin Technologists, it is clear that many pat-
ented hazardous waste cleanup products and processes implicate
strong public interest concerns that could justify denying a perma-
nent injunction for infringement of such a patent. Under those
cases, where the public interest in access to a particular technol-
ogy outweighs the patent holder's interest in exclusivity, an in-
junction can be denied."" Whether the exceptional circumstances
" See Albert Gore, Jr., Additional Views for "Superfund" Report, H.R. REP. 1016,
at 62-64 (1980). Compare Tom Loeffley & Dave Stockman, Dissenting Views of Repre-
sentatives Stockman and Loeffler, H.R. REP. 1016, at 70 - 75 (1980) ("There is [sic] no
real criteria [sic] to enforce cost minimization in the response plan.").
11 See Southern Pacific Petition, supra note 29, at 1, indicating the government-man-
dated use of a patented in situ vitrification process in the cleanup of nonradioactive hazard-
ous waste. In this particular instance, however, it appears that the patent is government-
owned,
88 See also Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858, 866-67
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
PATENTS
J. NAT, RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
of these cases can be extrapolated to fit the general circumstances
of CERCLA cleanup sites is, of course, the defining question and
is perhaps better suited to legislative debate.8 9
Clearly, Congress could decide that the overriding public in-
terest in the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste sites outweighs
any previously expressed interest in patent exclusivity.90 However,
section 7608 of the Clean Air Act suggests that even where there
is a strong public interest in achieving an environmental goal,
Congress may require more before permitting compulsory patent
licensing. Of course, the contextual circumstances of CERCLA
and the Clean Air Act differ markedly. On the other hand, debate
might reveal that compulsory licensing in this area would stifle
further innovation. That innovation is imperative if CERCLA's
overriding cleanup goals are to be achieved.
The Clean Air Act forced private companies to meet stated
emission requirements or risk going out of business. The expecta-
tion was, and is, that research and development, especially in tar-
get industries like the automobile industry, would be undertaken
by existing players, and the government's only role is that of
policeman.
CERCLA, on the other hand, involves active government in-
volvement in the identification, funding, and supervision of
Superfund sites. 1 Prior to CERCLA, there was no noticeable en-
vironmental cleanup industry. CERCLA, however, created a sig-
nificant demand for many products and services that did not pre-
viously exist by raising a Damoclean sword of penalties and
cleanup funding. Over the 14 years of its existence, CERCLA has
forced responsible parties to pay whatever it takes to clean up
these Superfund sites. As a result, demand for continued innova-
tion has -soared, and research continues at a record pace. Ironi-
cally, the continued innovation has occurred in part to meet the
demand for reducing the cost of Superfund cleanup efforts.
As with other research, however, a depression in prices
caused by compulsory licensing (and competitive bidding), while
11 Compulsory licensing advocates and opponents have historically been enmeshed in
an all or nothing controversy. If Congress considers compulsory licensing of CERCLA re-
lated technology, rather than mandating compulsory licenses, it could offer courts the op-
portunity to apply a defined public interest standard under existing equity principles.
11 But see Frank 1. Schechter, Comment, Would Compulsory Licensing of Patents Be
Unconstitutional?, 22 VA. L. REV. 287 (1935-36).
9' 42 U.S.C. §§ 960-9657.
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lowering short-term cleanup costs, could reduce the level of re-
search investment and result in fewer innovations in hazardous
waste cleanup in the future. Those who suggest otherwise ignore
the realities of economics and corporate behavior. As a practical
matter research corporations require an anticipated high return on
investment to justify continued research effort. Profitability re-
quires that failures, as well as successes, be taken into account."
A broad CERCLA compulsory licensing scheme could prove
a significant deterrent to continued research, especially by small
companies. Small companies could gain significant economies of
scale by free-riding on other research efforts rather than investing
in their own research programs. Thus, their present incentive to
innovate would be replaced by a strategy of simply waiting to li-
cense the most recent technology, by compulsion if necessary. This
type of free-riding would clearly drive hazardous waste cleanup
prices down. Are we willing to pay the price, however, of fewer
advanced processes for cleanup?
In 1970, Congress used a concentration-of-power element in
an effort to dull the impact of section 7608 on air pollution tech-
nology development. Whether that provision played a role in the
development of technology to meet the Clean Air Act's emission
standards is unknown. Adding a similar concentration-of-power
element to a CERCLA compulsory licensing provision would not
avoid the liklihood of free-riders. CERCLA, unlike the Clean Air
Act, is not nearly so result oriented. Under the Clean Air Act,
virtually any means of compliance with emission standards was
acceptable. Alternative technologies were envisioned as possible,
or even probable, as competitors raced to find the most efficient
means to meet emission limits. The Clean Air Act was not preoc-
cupied with alternative costs, so long as cost did not become so
burdensome as to result in a concentration of power based primar-
ily on pollution control monopolies.
CERCLA, on the other hand, is concerned as much with the
process of cleanup as with the result. The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) and other federal agencies exercise significant
control over what processes will be used to clean hazardous waste
sites. Thus, cleanup processes or devices that might be successful
in a fully free market may not be acceptable under the Superfund
mechanism.
" Whitaker, supra note 2, at 163-68.
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Potential alternative methods for cleanup, while available in
the marketplace, might not be used for a variety of reasons, the
most important being that the remedy might not be acceptable to
the controlling governmental authority. As a result, there can be a
large increase in the concentration of market power for every "ap-
proved" patented cleanup product or process, regardless of
whether substitutes are available. Therefore, the addition of a
market concentration factor in a CERCLA compulsory licensing
provision may not be workable and probably would not result in
narrowing the provision as did section 7608 of the Clear Air Act.
B. The Current Situation
Currently, there is not a compulsory patent license provision
in CERCLA. Whether a provision could be devised that would
ensure access to vital cleanup technology, while not completely sti-
fling innovation, is unclear. It remains to be seen whether Con-
gressional and public attitudes toward the program of hazardous
waste cleanup will lead to a call for compulsory licensing of essen-
tial, proprietary technology in this area.
In the meantime, however, one existing statutory provision is
readily available as a fallback to a CERCLA compulsory licens-
ing provision. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the government may sim-
ply "take" a license to any existing United States patent.93 Sec-
tion 1498 provides that a patentee shall be entitled to a reasonable
royalty for use resulting from this type of taking. Rather than en-
acting a CERCLA compulsory licensing statute, Congress could
allow EPA to rely on section 1498 to designate patented processes
or devices for use in Superfund cleanup efforts and cast the bur-
den of royalties for such use on the public, by placing the burden
of reimbursement for royalties on government contractors. Two
problems are inherent with this scheme, however. First, like a
compulsory licensing scheme, it injects the government and courts
into what should be private licensing negotiations. Second, it does
nothing to address the effects of compulsory licensing on future
innovation. Without addressing this problem, this type of solution
is no solution at all.




The need to continue improving the nation's hazardous waste
cleanup effort, while minimizing the cost of that endeavor, places
conflicting pressures upon Congress. On one hand, Congress must
enact legislation that solves the hazardous waste problem quickly
and cost-effectively. On the other hand, that same legislation can-
not stifle the source of innovation that will allow better and less
expensive cleanup in the long run. As Congress balances these
competing needs and goals, it will be interesting to see whether
compulsory licensing reappears as a proposed solution.

